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Summary
National health reform will result in additional spending 
by both federal and state governments as more Americans 
gain access to affordable health care, typically because of 
publicly funded subsidies. But there will also be important 
sources of savings for state and local governments. In this 
paper, we use the Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model (HIPSM) to produce a consistent set of estimates 
for important spending and savings items. In addition to 
national estimates, we present state-level estimates for all 
increased costs included in the national estimates, as well  
as some of the savings. We find that:
•	Total state savings would exceed states’ new costs, as 
federal dollars substitute for projected state and local 
spending without the ACA, and as states eliminate 
current Medicaid eligibility for adults who qualify for 
federal subsidies in the exchange. Overall, the federal 
government would spend $704 billion to $743 billion 
more under health reform than without it. The states, 
on the other hand, would spend $92 to $129 billion 
less under the ACA than without it over the same time 
period, between 2014 and 2019 (Figure 2). 
•	 If states leave current Medicaid eligibility unchanged, the 
Medicaid expansion would lead to $526 billion in additional 
federal and $14 billion in additional state spending from 
2014 to 2019.  These figures, both of which are included 
in the above totals, are made up of two components. State 
spending on additional enrollees, both among those who 
qualify today and those who are newly eligible, will rise by 
$80 billion. However, these costs are offset by $66 billion 
in new federal spending on existing enrollees under the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), as such enrollees move into 
eligibility categories that qualify for higher levels of federal 
support (Figure 1). The federal government would also 
spend $345 billion on premium and cost-sharing subsidies 
in the new health benefit exchanges. 
•	There would be considerable state and regional variation 
in these costs and savings, reflecting differences in 
factors such as current Medicaid eligibility rules and the 
characteristics of the pre-reform uninsured.
•	Elimination of Medicaid eligibility for certain adults  
with incomes above 138 percent of the Federal Poverty 
Level (FPL) will be one source of state savings included 
in the above totals. Between 2014 and 2019, states will 
save $69 billion, while the federal government saves $89 
billion. Part of this maintenance of effort savings will 
come from discontinued eligibility through Section 1115 
waivers and Social Security Act Section 1931, accounting 
for $11.6 billion and $10.3 billion in federal and collective 
state savings, respectively. A portion of these federal 
savings will be offset by federal spending on premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies, as these low-income adults  
are likely to move into the exchange when they lose 
Medicaid eligibility.
•	By significantly reducing the uninsured population,  
the ACA will roughly halve spending on uncompensated 
care. If states and the federal government reduce their 
total spending on uncompensated care by 12.5 percent 
to 25 percent, the federal government will save between 
$39 billion and $78 billion while states collectively save 
$26 billion to $52 billion, which is included in the  
above estimates. 
•	 States will also reduce spending on individuals with 
mental illness. Currently, state and local governments 
use general fund dollars to pay for a large portion of 
state mental health costs. The ACA will extend Medicaid 
to many low-income people with mental illness who 
previously were uninsured, increasing state mental 
Figure 1. The Effect of the Medicaid Expansion on State Budgets
$80 billion in spending 
on new enrollees
$66 billion in state 
savings on existing 
enrollees
=$14 billion in net state spending
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Introduction
Many observers have tried to  
estimate the fiscal effects of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) on states.
1
 Various estimates 
have focused on the state Medicaid 
costs that will result from increased 
enrollment.
2
 Some have noted the cost 
effects of various possible state policy 
choices, such as a state decision to 
retain increased Medicaid payment 
rates for certain primary care providers 
after additional federal funding for that 
increase ends in 2015.
3
 Relatively few 
have sought to compare both the costs 
and savings that states could realize 
under the ACA. Most studies in the latter 
category have found that, as a whole, 
states are likely to come out ahead.
4
This paper adds to the prior literature 
by combining national and state-specific 
estimates of both costs and fiscal gains 
for states, coupled with analysis of fiscal 
effects for the federal government. Our 
national estimates differ from those 
in prior Urban Institute publications 
for several reasons: we use 2011 data, 
rather than 2010 data, to develop 
baseline estimates; our Medicaid cost 
projections include children as well as 
adults; and we provide national cost 
estimates of the savings from state 
elimination of eligibility categories for 
adults with incomes above 138 percent 
of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) that 
go beyond coverage provided pursuant 
to 1115 waivers and Section 1931 of the 
Social Security Act.
Factors for which we estimate cost 
effects in each state include:
•	 Increased Medicaid enrollment among 
both currently eligible and newly 
eligible individuals;
•	Eliminating or reducing spending on 
optional Medicaid coverage for certain 
adults with modified adjusted gross 
income (MAGI)
5
 above 138 percent  
of the FPL, who will qualify for 
federally subsidized coverage in the 
exchange; 
•	Reducing state and local spending 
on uncompensated care because of 
federal Medicaid dollars, federally 
subsidized coverage in the exchange, 
and private sources of health coverage 
for the newly insured; 
•	 Increasing the federal matching rate 
applicable to certain adults who are 
currently eligible for Medicaid in 
some states; and
•	Providing federal subsidies for  
health plans in the exchange  
serving state residents who do  
not qualify for Medicaid. 
Two additional effects are included in 
our national, but not our state estimates: 
•	Because of significant interstate 
differences involving the structure 
of mental health and substance 
abuse services, we produce only 
national estimates of aggregate state 
and federal cost effects when state 
spending on mental health services is 
replaced by federal Medicaid dollars. 
•	Our state-specific cost estimates 
of eliminating Medicaid eligibility 
for adults above 138 percent of the 
FPL are limited to two categories of 
Medicaid eligibility: waivers under 
Section 1115 of the Social Security 
Act; and families’ eligibility under 
Section 1931 of the Social Security 
Act. National survey data are sufficient 
to estimate cost effects from cutting 
back other Medicaid eligibility for 
adults above 138 percent FPL, but 
they do not suffice to develop reliable 
state-specific estimates. 
As a result, our state-specific estimates 
do not reflect the full measure of savings 
that states will experience under the 
ACA, based on the factors quantified  
in this paper. Other state fiscal effects 
are entirely outside the scope of both 
our national and state-specific  
analysis, including:
•	 State savings on the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) after 2015, 
when federal matching rates could 
increase by 23 percentage points or 
health programs’ federal funding. Using 25 to 50 percent 
of these federal dollars to substitute for state and local 
spending, states could collectively save between $11 
billion and $22 billion dollars from 2014-2019, which is 
part of our totals. 
•	 From 2020 onwards, federal match rates for new Medicaid 
eligibles would be 90 percent, lower than during the 
period from 2014 to 2019. States would thus spend more 
on new Medicaid enrollees than previously. States would 
nevertheless achieve net savings under the ACA because 
savings would continue to exceed increased costs. Net 
annual state savings would be $12 billion to $19 billion 
for the year 2020, with similar amounts in later years.
Because of limitations in state-level data, we could not 
translate all of the above savings into state-specific 
numbers. Accordingly, our state estimates show a less 
favorable fiscal picture for states and localities than is 
indicated by our national estimates, which themselves 
probably undercount net state fiscal gains under the ACA. 
Figure 2. The Effect of the ACA on Federal and State Budgets
$704 billion to $743 
billion in Federal 
spending
$92 billion to $129 
billion in state 
savings
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state spending obligations could end 
entirely, depending on what Congress 
does about the program;
•	 State savings from increasing the 
applicable Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage (FMAP) for certain adults 
with incomes under 138 percent 
FPL (including the medically needy 
and some recipients of home- and 
community-based services) by 
reclassifying such adults as  
“newly eligible;” 
•	Potential state Medicaid savings from 
the more efficient and coordinated 
management of care furnished to 
seniors and people with disabilities 
who are dually eligible for both 
Medicare and Medicaid; 
•	Potential state and local cost savings 
on Medicaid and public employee 
coverage resulting from delivery 
system and payment reforms; 
•	Effects on Medicaid administrative 
costs for states, which might fall 
because of more data-driven and 
less labor-intensive eligibility 
determination,
6
 or might rise  
because of the increased volume  
of applications;
•	 Increased state revenue from taxes on 
insurance premiums, which will rise 
with the number of insured;
•	Modest increases in income and sales 
tax receipts, resulting from increased 
wages paid by the small minority 
of employers that reduce their 
compensation of workers through 
health insurance offers;
7
 
•	 Lower premiums for public employee 
coverage resulting from reduced 
cost-shifting that follows from less 
uncompensated care—an effect 
emphasized by some (but not all) 
analysts;
8
 and
•	 Increased state and local public 
employee health costs resulting  
from more acceptance of coverage 
offers caused by the ACA’s  
individual mandate. 
On balance, the factors we could not 
include in our national estimates are 
Table 1: ACA’s State Budget Effects, Included in and Excluded from this Paper
National 
Estimates
State-Specific 
Estimates
Not Included  
in Paper
Favorable Effects 
on State and Local 
Budgets
Ending Medicaid for adults > 138 percent of FPL covered by §§1115 and 1931 X X
Reduced spending on uncompensated care X X
Higher FMAP for some adults under §§1115 and 1931 X X
Ending Medicaid for adults > 138 percent of FPL covered outside §§1115 and 1931 X
Replacing state spending on mental health services with federal Medicaid dollars X
Reduced state spending on CHIP after FY 2015 X
Increasing FMAP for adults’ current Medicaid coverage outside §§1115 and 1931 X
Potential savings on dual eligibles X
Potential savings on public employee coverage from reduced cost-shifting X
Increased premium tax revenue X
Potential Medicaid and public employee savings from delivery system reform X
Increased income and sales tax revenue X
Uncertain Net Effects Medicaid administrative costs X
Unfavorable Effects State costs of increased Medicaid enrollment of currently eligible populations X X
State costs for newly eligible adults, 2017-2019 X X
State costs for newly eligible adults in 2020 and later years, when federal match 
reaches its low point of 90 percent
X
Higher public employee costs, more ESI offers accepted X
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likely to provide further net fiscal gains 
to states and localities.
9
Table 1 shows how this report addresses 
all of these potential state budget effects.
Results
In this paper, we estimate the state 
and federal shares of Medicaid and 
CHIP spending on acute care for the 
nonelderly, both with and without the 
ACA, for the years 2014 to 2019. We 
separately estimate effects for 2020, 
when the percentage of Medicaid costs 
paid by the federal government will 
reach its final level. We also estimate 
federal spending on subsidies in the 
exchange.
Under the ACA, there would be higher 
Medicaid enrollment and thus additional 
spending. For those previously ineligible 
for Medicaid, the federal government 
would pay the large majority of their 
costs—100 percent from 2014-2016, 
decreasing to 90 percent after 2019. Less 
obviously, there would be additional 
federal spending—and thus state 
savings—on certain current Medicaid 
enrollees in states that have extended 
income-based eligibility to adults close 
to or exceeding 133 percent of the FPL, 
since states will be able to reclassify 
such enrollees as “newly eligible” 
adults who qualify for enhanced federal 
funding levels, as we explain later in 
more detail. Also, states would no longer 
be required to maintain eligibility and 
current spending levels for many adults 
with incomes above 138 percent of the 
FPL after 2014. These would qualify for 
subsidized coverage in the new health 
benefit exchanges, subsidies that would 
be federally funded. For medically 
needy adults with incomes above that 
level, states could shift costs to the 
federal government without eliminating 
Medicaid eligibility. Such adults would 
obtain comprehensive coverage in the 
exchange, so they would generally take 
much longer to meet applicable “spend-
down” requirements. 
Also, the increase in insurance coverage 
under the ACA would substantially 
reduce the amount spent on 
uncompensated care. This would lead 
to significant savings for both federal 
and state governments. Finally, a certain 
amount of spending on mental health 
services currently funded by state 
general fund dollars would be paid by 
Medicaid, typically through coverage of 
newly eligible adults. Thus, a significant 
portion would be funded by the federal 
government, allowing federal funds to 
substitute for current state spending.
Table 2 summarizes our estimates 
for 2014-2019 nationally. If eligibility 
for adults remained unchanged, the 
Medicaid expansion would result in 
additional federal spending of $460 
billion and additional state spending  
of $80 billion. However, federal matching 
rates increase for certain populations 
of adults in limited benefits programs 
and prior expansion states, explained in 
more detail later in the paper, leading 
to an additional $66 billion of federal 
spending and state savings of the same 
amount. Additionally, if states were to 
rescind eligibility for certain adults above 
138 percent of the FPL or otherwise 
shift their costs to federally subsidized 
coverage in the exchange, there would 
be savings of $89 billion at the federal 
and $69 billion at the state level.
10
 The 
federal government would spend $345 
billion in premium and cost-sharing 
subsidies in the exchanges. With gains 
in insurance coverage, payments for 
uncompensated care would decline by 
$39 billion to $78 billion for the federal 
government and $26 billion to $52 
billion for state and local governments. 
An additional effect of ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion is that federal Medicaid dollars 
would substitute for $11 billion to $22 
billion on mental health care that would 
otherwise be paid by state general funds. 
Both of these ranges reflect assumptions 
about the extent to which states and 
localities can substitute federal dollars 
for current spending, as explained later. 
In total, the federal government would 
spend $704 billion to $743 billion more 
Table 2: Effect of ACA on State and Federal Total Spending, 2014 - 2019
Billions $
Difference in Federal 
Spending
Difference in State 
Spending
Low High Low High
Medicaid expansion
1
460 460 80 80
Increased federal Medicaid match for currently eligible adults 66 66 -66 -66
Eliminating Medicaid eligibility for adults >138% FPL
2
-89 -89 -69 -69
Premium and cost-sharing subsidies in the exchanges 345 345 0 0
Uncompensated care savings -78 -39 -52 -26
Mental health savings
3
0 0 -22 -11
Total difference in spending 704 743 -129 -92
 
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2014-2019. 
1Spending on acute care for the nonelderly 
2 Federal savings in Medicaid spending partially offset by additonal federal spending on subsidies included in the fourth row. Adults include (a) those eligible for coverage under 1115 waivers and Social Security Act Section  
1931 and (b) 50% of others above 138% FPL who report Medicaid enrollment
3Federal mental health expenditures are included in the Medicaid expansion row.
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under the ACA than without it, but states 
would pay $92 billion to $129 billion 
less under the ACA. In the following, 
we consider each of these costs and 
savings in more detail and, whenever 
possible given the limitations of available 
data, provide state-by-state estimates. 
We also estimate patterns of spending 
and savings for 2020 and afterwards, 
when federal match rates would remain 
constant at lower levels than will apply 
in 2014-2019.
Medicaid and CHIP Spending
In Table 3, we estimate the total 
spending on acute care for the non-
elderly in each state, separating the 
federal and state shares. The numbers 
presented are totals from 2014 to 2019. 
In the “No Reform” scenario, eligibility 
rules are unchanged from current law. 
Enrollment and spending in Medicaid 
and CHIP would change over time in 
response to economic and demographic 
changes, and the federal matching rate 
would remain unchanged. 
The “Reform” scenario simulates the 
Medicaid expansion under the ACA and 
the effect on Medicaid/CHIP enrollment 
of other provisions of the law, such as 
the individual mandate. No changes are 
made to pre-ACA Medicaid eligibility. 
The scenario thus includes the effects 
of increased enrollment among children 
and adults who qualify for Medicaid 
or CHIP under current law. Those 
made eligible for Medicaid under the 
expansion—those previously ineligible, 
but whose income is below 138 percent 
of the FPL—would have 100 percent 
of their costs covered by the federal 
government from 2014 to 2016. This rate 
would be scaled back gradually to 90 
percent in 2020 and following years. 
Overall, the federal government would 
spend $460 billion and the state $80 
billion under the ACA. It is important to 
note, however, that there would  
be substantial additional federal 
spending—and thus state savings— 
on existing enrollees. Under the ACA, 
“newly eligible” adults for whom greatly 
enhanced federal funding is available 
include those who, under current 
law, qualify for less than full Medicaid 
benefits.
11
 Some states currently offer 
Medicaid with reduced benefits to 
some low-income adults through 
Section 1115 waivers; state spending 
on those adults could fall because of 
their reclassification as “newly eligible.” 
Further, seven states that, before ACA, 
already extended full Medicaid coverage 
to both parents and childless adults up 
to at least 100 percent FPL are identified 
here as “prior expansion” states. The 
ACA increases the federal match rate 
for childless adults who would have 
been classified as “newly eligible” in 
these states, starting in 2014 at halfway 
between the state’s normal rate and 100 
percent, gradually rising to 93 percent 
in 2019 and 90 percent in 2020 and 
later years.
12
 Table 3 by itself should 
not be used as an estimate of the cost 
of the Medicaid expansion; the savings 
in Table 4 should be included as well. 
The $80 billion in additional state costs 
would thus be offset by $66 billion in 
in state savings, even if states do not 
reduce Medicaid eligibility.
To illustrate differences in Medicaid 
spending patterns, compare New York 
and Texas. In New York, the federal 
government would spend $10.3 billion 
more on new enrollees from 2014 
to 2019 under the ACA, while the 
state would spend an additional $9.8 
billion, assuming that current eligibility 
categories were neither cut back nor 
received increased federal matching 
funds. However, New York qualifies 
as a prior expansion state. Parents up 
to 150 percent of the FPL and adult 
nonparents up to 100 percent of the FPL 
are currently eligible for full Medicaid 
benefits. Thus, many current enrollees 
with incomes below 138 percent of the 
FPL would have the federal government 
pay a larger share of their costs than 
under current law. In total, this would 
substitute $20.4 billion in federal 
dollars for current-law state costs. Thus 
New York’s state and local spending 
on Medicaid declines by a net amount 
of $10.6 billion, notwithstanding (a) 
increased enrollment of parents and 
children who qualify for Medicaid under 
current law, for whom the state must 
pay its standard share of Medicaid costs 
and (b) the state’s responsibility to begin 
paying a small portion of the cost of 
newly eligible adults, beginning in 2017.
In Texas, the federal government 
would spend $49.4 billion more and 
the state would spend $5.3 billion 
more, assuming that current eligibility 
categories are neither reduced nor 
benefit from increased federal funding 
levels. In Texas, adult parents are 
eligible today only up to 26 percent 
of the FPL, and there is no income-
based eligibility pathway for adult 
nonparents. As a result, Texas is not 
a prior expansion state benefiting 
from additional federal spending on 
existing enrollees. Further, it does not 
extend limited benefits to otherwise 
ineligible low-income adults through 
1115 waivers. As a result, Table 4 
does not show any increase in federal 
funding for existing Medicaid eligibles. 
However, both New York and Texas 
will benefit from increased funding 
for other “limited benefit” eligibility 
categories that we did not model, 
because of limitations in available data, 
including coverage of women diagnosed 
with breast and cervical cancer, certain 
disabled recipients of home- and 
community-based services or nursing 
home care, participants in the state’s 
family planning waiver (and potentially 
pregnant women, depending on how 
HHS interprets the ACA). 
These examples show the importance 
of pre-ACA Medicaid eligibility rules 
in determining the fiscal effects of the 
legislation on particular states. Other 
important factors include the number 
and income distribution of uninsured 
in a state. Currently, about 17 percent 
of the nonelderly in New York are 
uninsured, and 44 percent of these 
are below 138 percent of the FPL. In 
Texas, 30 percent of the nonelderly 
are uninsured. Nearly half of these are 
below 138 percent of the FPL. There 
would thus be considerably more newly 
eligible Medicaid enrollees in Texas than 
New York, resulting in a much larger 
infusion of federal Medicaid dollars into 
Texas—$49 billion, as shown by Table 3, 
compared to $31 billion for New York, 
as shown by Tables 3 and 4 combined.
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Table 3: Total State and Federal Medicaid Spending (Assuming Current State Financial Responsibilities 
Continue)1, 2014 - 2019 Totals 
Does Not Include State Savings On Existing Enrollees Shown In Table 4.
Millions $ No Reform Reform Difference
Federal Spending State Spending Federal Spending State Spending Federal Spending State Spending
New England: 70,603 63,347 78,384 67,475 7,781 4,127
Connecticut 10,653 10,554 12,174 12,028 1,520 1,474
Maine 11,147 6,143 12,706 6,885 1,558 742
Massachusetts 34,323 34,152 35,766 35,513 1,443 1,362
New Hampshire 3,611 3,602 5,285 3,826 1,675 224
Rhode Island 6,754 6,088 8,151 6,309 1,397 221
Vermont 4,116 2,808 4,304 2,914 188 106
Middle Atlantic: 236,667 221,346 275,855 242,211 39,189 20,865
Delaware 3,230 3,222 3,750 3,718 519 496
District of Columbia 4,628 1,983 5,339 2,036 711 53
Maryland 11,531 11,531 18,121 12,284 6,590 753
New Jersey 24,653 24,524 35,374 26,207 10,721 1,683
New York 121,851 121,239 132,180 131,020 10,329 9,781
Pennsylvania 70,774 58,846 81,092 66,946 10,318 8,100
East North Central: 255,607 177,984 321,216 192,598 65,609 14,615
Illinois 55,118 54,185 71,317 56,860 16,199 2,675
Indiana 52,011 28,924 60,464 33,435 8,453 4,511
Michigan 56,754 37,172 68,953 38,742 12,199 1,570
Ohio 67,430 41,084 91,273 43,569 23,843 2,485
Wisconsin 24,293 16,619 29,209 19,992 4,916 3,373
West North Central: 103,835 71,172 131,440 76,329 27,606 5,157
Iowa 13,765 8,228 14,432 8,643 668 415
Kansas 12,596 8,283 15,864 8,580 3,269 297
Minnesota 20,966 20,966 24,201 22,012 3,235 1,046
Missouri 41,680 24,276 56,987 27,136 15,307 2,860
Nebraska 7,046 4,788 9,148 5,098 2,102 310
North Dakota 1,817 1,060 3,053 1,177 1,235 117
South Dakota 5,966 3,571 7,755 3,683 1,790 112
South Atlantic: 194,958 128,110 311,715 137,273 116,757 9,163
Florida 62,884 50,634 109,659 55,354 46,776 4,720
Georgia 34,631 18,902 55,851 20,449 21,220 1,547
North Carolina 46,585 25,511 69,433 26,608 22,848 1,096
South Carolina 17,987 7,675 27,700 8,235 9,713 560
Virginia 21,550 21,379 31,374 22,303 9,824 925
West Virginia 11,321 4,008 17,697 4,323 6,376 315
East South Central: 137,441 62,513 182,596 65,052 45,155 2,539
Alabama 26,721 12,552 37,352 13,153 10,631 601
Kentucky 43,605 18,541 54,725 19,088 11,120 547
Mississippi 24,037 7,656 31,609 8,020 7,572 364
Tennessee 43,078 23,765 58,910 24,792 15,832 1,027
West South Central: 153,894 90,577 228,223 97,557 74,329 6,980
Arkansas 15,030 5,613 21,810 5,989 6,781 377
Louisiana 19,781 7,958 32,175 8,797 12,394 839
Oklahoma 24,324 12,586 30,095 13,073 5,771 487
Texas 94,760 64,420 144,143 69,697 49,383 5,277
Mountain: 81,558 48,268 107,067 53,258 25,509 4,990
Arizona 33,298 17,354 37,037 18,807 3,740 1,453
Colorado 11,769 11,749 19,800 12,438 8,031 689
Idaho 6,715 2,905 8,818 3,054 2,102 148
Montana 3,486 1,630 4,736 1,729 1,250 99
Nevada 5,242 5,231 8,863 5,552 3,620 320
New Mexico 11,566 4,752 14,262 5,774 2,696 1,023
Utah 8,209 3,376 11,292 4,557 3,083 1,181
Wyoming 1,272 1,270 2,260 1,347 988 77
Pacific: 185,320 178,762 243,789 190,142 58,469 11,380
Alaska 1,496 1,464 2,460 1,572 964 108
California 148,487 147,955 196,451 154,157 47,965 6,202
Hawaii 3,892 3,171 4,660 3,747 768 576
Oregon 11,291 6,776 16,315 9,551 5,024 2,775
Washington 20,154 19,396 23,903 21,116 3,749 1,719
Total 1,419,883 1,042,078 1,880,287 1,121,895 460,404 79,816
 
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2014-2019. 
1Spending on acute care for the nonelderly. Assumes all current eligibility categories continue, without any enhanced federal funding. 
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Table 4: New Federal Medicaid Spending and State Savings on Existing 
Enrollees1, 2014 - 2019 Totals
Millions $ Reform
Limited Benefits Prior Expansion Total
New England: 3,059 7,346 10,405
Connecticut 3,059 0 3,059
Maine 0 981 981
Massachusetts 0 5,790 5,790
New Hampshire 0 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 0
Vermont 0 575 575
Middle Atlantic: 10,016 21,534 31,551
Delaware 0 1,181 1,181
District of Columbia 0 0 0
Maryland 0 0 0
New Jersey 0 0 0
New York 0 20,354 20,354
Pennsylvania 10,016 0 10,016
East North Central: 10,394 0 10,394
Illinois 0 0 0
Indiana 5,179 0 5,179
Michigan 0 0 0
Ohio 0 0 0
Wisconsin 5,215 0 5,215
West North Central: 2,017 0 2,017
Iowa 1,758 0 1,758
Kansas 0 0 0
Minnesota 259 0 259
Missouri 0 0 0
Nebraska 0 0 0
North Dakota 0 0 0
South Dakota 0 0 0
South Atlantic: 0 0 0
Florida 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0
North Carolina 0 0 0
South Carolina 0 0 0
Virginia 0 0 0
West Virginia 0 0 0
East South Central: 0 0 0
Alabama 0 0 0
Kentucky 0 0 0
Mississippi 0 0 0
Tennessee 0 0 0
West South Central: 0 0 0
Arkansas 0 0 0
Louisiana 0 0 0
Oklahoma 0 0 0
Texas 0 0 0
Mountain: 2,352 4,843 7,195
Arizona 0 4,843 4,843
Colorado 0 0 0
Idaho 0 0 0
Montana 0 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0
New Mexico 1,761 0 1,761
Utah 591 0 591
Wyoming 0 0 0
Pacific: 3,812 715 4,527
Alaska 0 0 0
California 0 0 0
Hawaii 0 715 715
Oregon 3,030 0 3,030
Washington 782 0 782
Total 31,651 34,437 66,088
 
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2014-2019.
1Spending on acute care for the nonelderly
Notes: Before ACA, “limited benefit” states provided less than full Medicaid benefits to some adults through 1115 waivers; and “prior expansion” states 
covered parents and childless adults up to at least 100 percent FPL. These states will experience increased federal matching rates for some of these 
adults. This table underestimates state savings by failing to account for (a) income disregards in some states; (b) premium support programs; and (c) 
limited benefits provided to adults outside 1115 waivers, including through medically needy eligibility. 
In Table 5, we estimate the savings  
from eliminating Medicaid eligibility  
for certain adults over 138 percent of 
the FPL or otherwise shifting some 
of their costs to federally subsidized 
coverage in the exchange. For each 
state, we show the savings we can 
identify based on terminating eligibility 
now provided to adults above 138 
percent of the FPL through Section  
1115 waivers or Section 1931, as  
noted earlier. There are other categories 
of eligibility for which a state could 
revoke eligibility above 138 percent of 
the FPL, such as coverage of pregnant 
women and special eligibility categories 
for adults with tuberculosis, breast 
cancer or cervical cancer. Also, as  
noted above, a significant proportion  
of medically needy costs for such adults 
will shift to the exchange as they gain 
comprehensive coverage and face much 
greater difficulty incurring the costs 
needed to trigger the start of Medicaid 
payments. However, state-specific 
survey data are insufficient, given our 
existing eligibility models, to estimate 
state-specific effects for these eligibility 
categories, so we do not include those 
effects in Table 5, even though some 
of those effects are included in our 
national estimates shown in Table 2.
Texas, for example, does not have any 
eligibility for adults above 138 percent 
of the FPL under 1115 waivers or Section 
1931. Thus, we show no savings in the 
state-specific estimates, even though 
Texas may be able to realize savings 
by moving to the exchange certain 
Medicaid-enrolled adults over 138 
percent FPL who cannot be identified 
based on information available in the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), such 
as pregnant women, women diagnosed 
with breast and cervical cancer, etc. 
In California, the state extends 
eligibility to some adults with MAGI 
over 138 percent of the FPL in eligibility 
categories for which we can produce 
state-specific estimates. By moving these 
adults over 138 percent FPL into the 
exchange, California would take them 
off Medicaid, allowing $2.2 billion in 
savings for both the state and federal 
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governments within two eligibility 
groups alone—namely, those covered 
under 1931 and 1115 waivers. Because  
of California’s 50 percent FMAP, the 
state and the federal government would 
share evenly in these savings. As with 
Texas, California could obtain additional 
savings through cutting back other 
optional Medicaid eligibility categories 
for which we could not produce state-
specific estimates. In both states—as 
in all states—the federal government’s 
Medicaid savings would be offset by 
increased federal spending on subsidies 
in the exchange. For those below 200 
percent of the FPL who qualify for 
exchange subsidies, federal spending 
on subsidies would in general exceed 
federal Medicaid savings. That is so 
because (a) subsidies are funded entirely 
by the federal government in the 
exchange, without any state matching 
share; and (b) private insurance costs 
typically exceed Medicaid costs for 
serving comparable populations, 
primarily because of higher provider 
payments with private coverage.
13
 Put 
differently, shifting costs from Medicaid 
to the exchange saves money for 
states but is likely to increase federal 
spending. 
There are major open questions 
regarding the future of CHIP under the 
ACA. While federal match rates will 
increase after 2016 by 23 percentage 
points, the necessary federal funds were 
not allocated. There appear to be three 
possible scenarios for the future of the 
program: the law remains unchanged 
and federal funding for CHIP becomes 
exhausted; the higher match rates 
remain unchanged and federal funding 
is added for 2017 and later years; or the 
law is amended to continue current 
match rates while adding federal 
funding after 2016. The result of the  
first would likely be major declines 
in CHIP enrollment and the shifting 
of many of those children above 138 
percent of the FPL into the exchanges. 
This would lead to a significant decrease 
in state spending, though the families 
affected would likely pay higher 
premiums and cost sharing. The second 
scenario would also see lower state 
spending because of higher federal 
Table 5: Federal and State Spending Effects From Eliminating Medicaid  
Eligibility >138% FPL Under 1115 Waivers and Section 1931,  
2014 - 2019 Totals
Millions $ Reform
Federal Spending State Spending
New England: -1,762 -1,611
Connecticut -176 -176
Maine -72 -40
Massachusetts -1,089 -1,089
New Hampshire 0 0
Rhode Island -75 -67
Vermont -349 -238
Middle Atlantic: -1,639 -1,571
Delaware -2 -2
District of Columbia -117 -50
Maryland -157 -157
New Jersey -1,276 -1,276
New York -80 -80
Pennsylvania -7 -6
East North Central: -2,438 -1,985
Illinois -1,045 -1,032
Indiana1 0 0
Michigan 0 0
Ohio 0 0
Wisconsin -1,393 -953
West North Central: -1,525 -1,221
Iowa -754 -450
Kansas 0 0
Minnesota -771 -771
Missouri 0 0
Nebraska 0 0
North Dakota 0 0
South Dakota 0 0
South Atlantic: -4 -2
Florida 0 0
Georgia 0 0
North Carolina -4 -2
South Carolina 0 0
Virginia 0 0
West Virginia 0 0
East South Central: 0 0
Alabama 0 0
Kentucky 0 0
Mississippi 0 0
Tennessee 0 0
West South Central: 0 0
Arkansas
2
0 0
Louisiana 0 0
Oklahoma
2
0 0
Texas 0 0
Mountain: -658 -374
Arizona -515 -268
Colorado 0 0
Idaho 0 0
Montana 0 0
Nevada -80 -80
New Mexico -55 -22
Utah -9 -4
Wyoming 0 0
Pacific: -3,558 -3,503
Alaska 0 0
California -2,190 -2,190
Hawaii -34 -28
Oregon
1
0 0
Washington -1,334 -1,284
Total -11,585 -10,267
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2014-2019.
1State has potential savings but due to a small sample size, no such records exist in our data.
2State has premium assistance for adults that is not included as a limited benefits program in our model.
Note: This table does not list savings on state Medicaid costs in other eligibility categories above 138% FPL,
some of which are included in Table 2. 
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matching rates. For this work, we 
simulated the third scenario. In other 
words, given the current uncertainty, 
we do not factor in either (a) any 
potential effects from the possible end 
of federal CHIP allotments, and the 
consequent expiration of state matching 
obligations, or (b) the provision of 
enhanced CHIP match rates.
Premium and Cost-Sharing 
Subsidies in the Exchanges
Under the ACA, subsidized coverage  
in the new health insurance exchanges 
will be available to those with incomes 
below 400 percent of the FPL who are 
not eligible for public coverage, such 
as Medicaid, and who do not have an 
affordable offer of ESI coverage. There 
are two types of subsidies. Premium 
subsidies reduce the premium that an 
enrollee would have to pay, and cost-
sharing subsidies reduce the amount a 
family would pay for health care out-
of-pocket. These subsidies are paid for 
entirely by the federal government. In 
Table 6, we show the spending on each, 
state by state.
To illustrate some causes of state-
level variation in exchange spending, 
consider Minnesota and Utah. Despite 
their overall difference in population 
(estimated 4.5 million and 2.5 million, 
respectively, in 2011), these states have 
about the same number of nonelderly 
uninsured (estimated 460,000 and 
430,000, respectively). However, 
217,000 of these are between 138 and 
400 percent of the FPL in Minnesota, 
while only 165,000 are in that range 
in Utah. It should come as no surprise, 
then, that $4.3 billion would be spent 
on subsidies in Minnesota from 2014 to 
2019, but only $2.8 billion in Utah.
There would be $39 billion in additional 
federal spending on exchange subsidies 
under the higher savings listed in Table 
2 based on reductions in Medicaid 
eligibility that go beyond 1115 waivers 
and Section 1931. Federal and private 
spending would substitute for the 
Medicaid spending of those adults above 
133 percent of the FPL losing eligibility. 
This is not included in either Table 5, as 
indicated above, or in Table 6.
Table 6: Federal Spending on Exchange Subsidies, 2014 - 2019 Totals
Millions $ Reform
Premium Subsidies Cost-Sharing Subsidies Total
New England: 7,839 1,202 9,041
Connecticut 2,240 295 2,535
Maine 1,113 172 1,285
Massachusetts 2,417 444 2,860
New Hampshire 802 60 862
Rhode Island 830 132 962
Vermont 437 100 537
Middle Atlantic: 37,698 4,680 42,377
Delaware 482 50 532
District of Columbia 395 63 458
Maryland 3,338 506 3,844
New Jersey 6,285 782 7,068
New York 16,715 1,860 18,575
Pennsylvania 10,482 1,418 11,900
East North Central: 37,297 4,890 42,187
Illinois 9,916 1,440 11,356
Indiana 4,273 666 4,939
Michigan 7,925 919 8,844
Ohio 9,888 1,264 11,151
Wisconsin 5,295 601 5,896
West North Central: 16,765 1,933 18,698
Iowa 2,115 281 2,396
Kansas 2,501 182 2,683
Minnesota 3,736 599 4,335
Missouri 5,162 471 5,633
Nebraska 1,682 223 1,906
North Dakota 692 71 762
South Dakota 876 106 983
South Atlantic: 43,615 5,376 48,991
Florida 19,341 2,125 21,466
Georgia 7,273 695 7,968
North Carolina 7,416 1,356 8,771
South Carolina 3,284 378 3,662
Virginia 5,352 735 6,087
West Virginia 949 87 1,037
East South Central: 14,713 1,751 16,465
Alabama 2,663 344 3,007
Kentucky 3,461 273 3,734
Mississippi 2,642 312 2,954
Tennessee 5,948 823 6,770
West South Central: 39,350 4,255 43,606
Arkansas 2,921 315 3,236
Louisiana 3,300 271 3,571
Oklahoma 3,229 354 3,583
Texas 29,900 3,315 33,215
Mountain: 22,356 1,844 24,200
Arizona 5,586 488 6,074
Colorado 4,839 361 5,200
Idaho 1,717 157 1,875
Montana 1,205 86 1,291
Nevada 2,467 211 2,678
New Mexico 3,239 247 3,486
Utah 2,543 236 2,778
Wyoming 761 57 818
Pacific: 52,445 5,482 57,927
Alaska 527 119 645
California 41,995 4,247 46,242
Hawaii 562 128 690
Oregon 3,691 449 4,140
Washington 5,669 540 6,209
Total 272,078 31,413 303,491
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2014-2019.
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Uncompensated Care
As Buettgens and colleagues showed 
in earlier research, the number of 
uninsured would be cut roughly in 
half under the ACA.
14
 Spending on 
uncompensated care for the uninsured 
would decrease by more than half 
(Table 7). Hadley and colleagues 
estimated that about 45 percent of 
uncompensated care is paid for by the 
federal government, 30 percent by 
state and local governments, and the 
remaining 25 percent from private 
sources such as health care providers.
15
 
States and localities pay hospitals and 
sometimes other providers through 
disproportionate share hospital 
payments, other grants and contracts 
from states or localities, direct operation 
of public hospitals, “general assistance-
type” health coverage, grants and 
delegation of taxing authority from 
states to localities, funding for medical 
schools, etc. Given the complexities of 
how uncompensated care is funded, 
the ACA’s reduction in payments to 
disproportionate share hospitals,
16
  
and the political difficulties of reducing 
provider payments at the same rate as 
the decrease in need for uncompensated 
care, it is not realistic to assume 
that the decrease in the amount of 
uncompensated care consumed would 
result in a corresponding amount of 
savings. We compute a moderate range 
for actual savings: between 25 and 
50 cents for every dollar in reduced 
uncompensated care spending, or 
between 12.5 and 25 percent of current 
spending on uncompensated care. 
We apply this to both the federal and 
the state/local government shares. 
Accordingly, we anticipate that state and 
local government will capture in savings 
just 7.5 to 15.0 percent of the total 
reduction in uncompensated care costs 
experienced in each state.
17
 
In Texas, for example, state and local 
governments’ share of uncompensated 
care costs for 2014-2019, based on 
nationally applicable percentages, 
would be $21.3 billion without reform 
and $9.6 billion under the ACA, as the 
amount of uncompensated care in 
Texas would decline by 55 percent. Our 
estimated savings would be from one 
quarter to one half of the difference, 
i.e., from $2.9 billion to $5.8 billion 
over the entire six-year period. The 
federal share of such costs in Texas 
would be $31.9 billion without reform 
and $14.4 billion under the ACA. 
The corresponding range of federal 
savings we estimate would thus be $4.4 
billion to $8.7 billion. Federal savings 
on uncompensated care are offset 
by federal subsidies in the exchange 
as well as federal Medicaid costs, 
including for newly eligible adults. That 
is because the main factor responsible 
for decreased uncompensated care is 
increased coverage through Medicaid 
and subsidies in the exchange.
State Savings on Mental  
Health Care
In FY 2008, state mental health agencies 
spent an estimated $36.8 billion. Of this 
amount, 45.4 percent, or $16.7 billion, 
represented state and local costs outside 
Medicaid.
18
 Medicaid paid for 46 percent 
of state mental health services, or $16.9 
billion. Other funds were provided 
by Medicare, federal block grants and 
additional sources. 
The ACA’s expansion of Medicaid 
coverage to reach adults with incomes 
up to 138 percent of FPL will have 
a major impact on these state-
administered systems of care. Among 
the adults served by state mental 
health agencies, 79 percent are either 
unemployed or outside the labor force. 
Nevertheless, 43 percent of consumers 
served by these agencies have no 
Medicaid coverage.
19
 
When the ACA is fully implemented, 
Medicaid coverage is expected to 
increase from 12.4 to 23.3 percent 
of individuals with mental illness 
or substance abuse disorders, and 
Medicaid’s mental health spending is 
projected to rise by 49.7 percent.
20
 If 
the latter increase had applied to state 
mental health agencies in FY 2008, their 
Medicaid revenue would have grown 
by $8.4 billion. Trended forward based 
on per capita changes in state and local 
health spending projected by the CMS 
Office of the Actuary,
21
 the increased 
Medicaid revenue would total $82.7 
billion for 2014-2019. Of this amount, 
$79.4 billion would represent new 
federal dollars, based on the average 
federal matching percentage projected 
for newly eligible adults.
22
 
Notwithstanding past patterns  
through which state policymakers  
have strategically used increased 
Medicaid dollars to reduce state 
budgetary commitments to mental 
health care,
32
 one should not overstate 
the extent to which Medicaid dollars 
can substitute for other resources. Many 
people served by state mental health 
agencies will continue to be uninsured. 
Some will have a connection to the 
criminal justice system that precludes 
eligibility for assistance, for example, 
and others may suffer from cognitive 
or other impairments that complicate 
Medicaid enrollment. Further, some 
important services are not easily 
reimbursable through Medicaid. 
Examples include care provided by 
Institutions for Mental Disease, which 
Medicaid traditionally excludes, and 
certain types of substance abuse 
treatment and residential support. And 
some of these new Medicaid dollars may 
be used to address unmet needs among 
the mentally ill, which are likely to 
grow in the wake of today’s state budget 
shortfalls and the resulting cuts to state-
funded mental health services. 
Taking these factors into account, if we 
assume that between a quarter and half 
of increased Medicaid reimbursement 
will substitute for state and local 
spending, state and local savings in this 
area would range from $13 billion to 
$26 billion over the six years from 2014 
to 2020 (total from Table 2 and Table 9). 
Because of major interstate differences 
in program structure and interplay 
with ACA coverage effects, we did not 
develop state-specific estimates of  
these savings. 
Offsetting Costs with Savings, 
2014-2019
In Table 8, we put together all of the 
cost and savings items for which we 
produced state-level estimates. For  
our national estimates (Tables 2 and 
10), we included two additional savings 
items for which we did not provide 
state-level estimates: a higher level of 
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Table 7: State and Federal Spending on Uncompensated Care, 2014 - 2019 Totals
No Reform Reform Low Savings2 High Savings3
Federal Share State Share Total
1
Federal Share State Share Total
1
Federal Share State Share Federal Share State Share
New England: 9,172 6,115 20,383 4,942 3,295 10,982 -1,058 -705 -2,115 -1,410
Connecticut 3,388 2,259 7,529 2,033 1,356 4,519 -339 -226 -677 -452
Maine 1,599 1,066 3,553 916 611 2,037 -171 -114 -341 -228
Massachusetts 1,609 1,073 3,576 1,008 672 2,240 -150 -100 -301 -200
New Hampshire 1,079 720 2,399 353 235 784 -182 -121 -363 -242
Rhode Island 1,033 689 2,297 381 254 848 -163 -109 -326 -217
Vermont 463 309 1,029 250 167 555 -53 -36 -107 -71
Middle Atlantic: 38,803 25,868 86,228 19,685 13,124 43,746 -4,779 -3,186 -9,559 -6,372
Delaware 1,192 795 2,649 336 224 746 -214 -143 -428 -285
District of Columbia 261 174 581 94 63 209 -42 -28 -84 -56
Maryland 3,202 2,135 7,116 1,473 982 3,273 -432 -288 -865 -576
New Jersey 5,923 3,949 13,162 2,881 1,920 6,401 -761 -507 -1,521 -1,014
New York 17,577 11,718 39,061 9,185 6,124 20,412 -2,098 -1,399 -4,196 -2,797
Pennsylvania 10,647 7,098 23,659 5,716 3,811 12,703 -1,233 -822 -2,465 -1,643
East North Central: 38,931 25,954 86,512 16,991 11,327 37,757 -5,485 -3,657 -10,970 -7,313
Illinois 11,980 7,986 26,621 6,669 4,446 14,819 -1,328 -885 -2,655 -1,770
Indiana 5,574 3,716 12,387 2,476 1,650 5,501 -775 -516 -1,549 -1,033
Michigan 7,424 4,949 16,498 3,594 2,396 7,986 -958 -638 -1,915 -1,277
Ohio 9,763 6,509 21,696 2,823 1,882 6,274 -1,735 -1,157 -3,470 -2,313
Wisconsin 4,190 2,793 9,311 1,430 953 3,177 -690 -460 -1,380 -920
West North Central: 13,089 8,726 29,086 4,429 2,953 9,843 -2,165 -1,443 -4,330 -2,886
Iowa 766 511 1,702 352 235 783 -103 -69 -207 -138
Kansas 2,223 1,482 4,939 896 597 1,990 -332 -221 -663 -442
Minnesota 2,587 1,725 5,749 906 604 2,013 -420 -280 -841 -560
Missouri 4,360 2,906 9,688 1,054 703 2,342 -826 -551 -1,653 -1,102
Nebraska 1,604 1,069 3,564 628 419 1,396 -244 -163 -488 -325
North Dakota 662 441 1,470 287 191 638 -94 -62 -187 -125
South Dakota 888 592 1,974 307 204 681 -145 -97 -291 -194
South Atlantic: 54,442 36,295 120,982 20,645 13,763 45,878 -8,449 -5,633 -16,898 -11,266
Florida 19,331 12,887 42,958 5,457 3,638 12,126 -3,469 -2,312 -6,937 -4,625
Georgia 9,821 6,547 21,824 4,476 2,984 9,948 -1,336 -891 -2,672 -1,781
North Carolina 12,996 8,664 28,879 6,920 4,614 15,378 -1,519 -1,013 -3,038 -2,025
South Carolina 4,740 3,160 10,533 1,026 684 2,281 -928 -619 -1,857 -1,238
Virginia 5,634 3,756 12,520 2,421 1,614 5,381 -803 -535 -1,606 -1,071
West Virginia 1,921 1,280 4,268 344 229 764 -394 -263 -788 -526
East South Central: 20,021 13,347 44,490 6,607 4,404 14,681 -3,353 -2,236 -6,707 -4,471
Alabama 4,469 2,979 9,931 1,882 1,255 4,183 -647 -431 -1,293 -862
Kentucky 5,147 3,431 11,437 1,022 681 2,271 -1,031 -687 -2,062 -1,375
Mississippi 3,586 2,390 7,968 1,800 1,200 4,001 -446 -298 -893 -595
Tennessee 6,819 4,546 15,154 1,902 1,268 4,227 -1,229 -820 -2,459 -1,639
West South Central: 41,998 27,998 93,328 16,910 11,273 37,577 -6,272 -4,181 -12,544 -8,363
Arkansas 3,135 2,090 6,967 919 613 2,043 -554 -369 -1,108 -739
Louisiana 3,441 2,294 7,646 627 418 1,393 -703 -469 -1,407 -938
Oklahoma 3,537 2,358 7,859 974 650 2,165 -641 -427 -1,281 -854
Texas 31,885 21,256 70,855 14,389 9,593 31,976 -4,374 -2,916 -8,748 -5,832
Mountain: 19,314 12,876 42,920 9,398 6,265 20,884 -2,479 -1,653 -4,958 -3,305
Arizona 4,498 2,999 9,997 2,713 1,808 6,028 -446 -298 -893 -595
Colorado 4,773 3,182 10,606 2,610 1,740 5,799 -541 -361 -1,082 -721
Idaho 1,249 833 2,776 668 446 1,485 -145 -97 -290 -194
Montana 682 455 1,516 340 227 757 -85 -57 -171 -114
Nevada 3,526 2,350 7,835 1,474 982 3,274 -513 -342 -1,026 -684
New Mexico 1,763 1,175 3,917 730 487 1,623 -258 -172 -516 -344
Utah 2,363 1,575 5,250 712 475 1,583 -413 -275 -825 -550
Wyoming 460 307 1,023 151 101 335 -77 -52 -155 -103
Pacific: 43,820 29,213 97,377 23,273 15,515 51,717 -5,137 -3,425 -10,274 -6,849
Alaska 538 359 1,196 194 129 430 -86 -57 -172 -115
California 34,024 22,683 75,610 18,107 12,071 40,238 -3,979 -2,653 -7,959 -5,306
Hawaii 916 610 2,035 774 516 1,721 -35 -24 -71 -47
Oregon 3,278 2,186 7,285 1,056 704 2,346 -556 -370 -1,111 -741
Washington 5,063 3,375 11,251 3,142 2,095 6,982 -480 -320 -960 -640
Total 279,588 186,392 621,307 122,879 81,920 273,065 -39,177 -26,118 -78,354 -52,236
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2014-2019.
1Federal and State spending on uncompensated care do not add to the total, which also takes into account private spending.
2Savings if the federal and state governments, respectively, reduce spending by 25 percent of the decline in their share of uncompensated care.
3Savings if the federal and state governments, respectively, reduce spending by 50 percent of the decline in their share of uncompensated care.
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Medicaid maintenance-of-effort savings 
for adults and savings on state mental 
health spending, as explained earlier. 
Other fiscal effects, most of which are 
favorable to states, are in neither our 
federal nor state estimates, as explained 
in the introduction. Considering only 
the factors for which state-specific 
estimates are provided, federal spending 
would increase by a total of $740 billion 
to $779 billion and state spending 
would decrease by $23 billion to $49 
billion. We see considerable variations 
in state spending under the high and 
low savings scenarios. States such as 
New York, Connecticut, Iowa, and 
Arizona would see significant savings 
under both scenarios. States such as 
California, Arkansas, Rhode Island, and 
North Carolina would see increased 
costs in the low scenario and reduced 
costs under the high scenarios, with  
the magnitude of savings under the high 
scenario being greater than or roughly 
equal in magnitude to the additional 
costs under the low scenario. States 
such as Texas, New Hampshire, and 
Colorado would see additional costs 
under the low scenario greater in 
magnitude that the savings under the 
high scenario. Finally, states such as 
Michigan, Utah, and Missouri would  
see additional spending under  
both scenarios.
For illustration, consider one state 
in each of these groups (Table 9). 
New York would save substantially 
on Medicaid expansion costs alone. 
This is because it is a prior expansion 
state, as explained earlier. The state 
would see some Maintenance of Effort 
(MOE) savings under our state-specific 
savings assumptions, and would see 
significant savings on uncompensated 
care spending. California and Texas 
would both see increased spending on 
Medicaid of $5-6 billion from 2014 to 
2019 and uncompensated care savings 
of the same magnitude. California 
would also have savings from reducing 
Medicaid eligibility for adults because 
its existing eligibility rules are more 
generous than in Texas. Net spending 
for both states would range from 
modestly negative to modestly positive. 
Michigan would spend $1.6 billion more 
Table 8: Differences in Total State and Federal Spending,  
ACA vs. No Reform, 2014 - 2019
Does not include savings on mental health costs and certain medicaid eligibility cutbacks over 138% fpl included in national results.
Difference in Federal Spending Difference in State Spending
Low Savings High Savings Low Savings High Savings
New England: 24,408 23,350 -8,593 -9,298
Connecticut 6,600 6,261 -1,987 -2,213
Maine 3,581 3,411 -393 -506
Massachusetts 8,854 8,703 -5,617 -5,717
New Hampshire 2,355 2,173 102 -19
Rhode Island 2,121 1,958 44 -64
Vermont 897 844 -743 -779
Middle Atlantic: 106,698 101,919 -15,443 -18,629
Delaware 2,016 1,802 -829 -972
District of Columbia 1,010 969 -25 -53
Maryland 9,844 9,412 308 19
New Jersey 15,752 14,991 -100 -607
New York 47,080 44,982 -12,051 -13,450
Pennsylvania 30,995 29,763 -2,744 -3,566
East North Central: 110,267 104,782 -1,421 -5,077
Illinois 25,182 23,854 758 -127
Indiana 17,796 17,022 -1,184 -1,701
Michigan 20,085 19,128 931 293
Ohio 33,260 31,525 1,329 172
Wisconsin 13,944 13,254 -3,254 -3,714
West North Central: 44,630 42,465 475 -968
Iowa 3,964 3,861 -1,863 -1,932
Kansas 5,620 5,288 76 -145
Minnesota 6,637 6,217 -264 -545
Missouri 20,113 19,287 2,309 1,758
Nebraska 3,764 3,520 148 -15
North Dakota 1,904 1,810 55 -8
South Dakota 2,627 2,481 15 -82
South Atlantic: 157,295 148,845 3,528 -2,105
Florida 64,773 61,305 2,408 95
Georgia 27,852 26,516 656 -235
North Carolina 30,096 28,577 81 -931
South Carolina 12,447 11,519 -59 -678
Virginia 15,108 14,305 389 -146
West Virginia 7,018 6,624 53 -210
East South Central: 58,267 54,913 303 -1,932
Alabama 12,991 12,345 170 -261
Kentucky 13,822 12,791 -140 -828
Mississippi 10,080 9,634 66 -231
Tennessee 21,373 20,144 208 -612
West South Central: 111,662 105,390 2,799 -1,382
Arkansas 9,463 8,909 7 -362
Louisiana 15,261 14,558 370 -99
Oklahoma 8,714 8,073 60 -367
Texas 78,224 73,851 2,362 -554
Mountain: 53,767 51,288 -4,232 -5,885
Arizona 13,695 13,248 -3,956 -4,253
Colorado 12,690 12,149 328 -32
Idaho 3,832 3,687 51 -45
Montana 2,455 2,370 42 -15
Nevada 5,706 5,193 -101 -443
New Mexico 7,630 7,372 -933 -1,105
Utah 6,031 5,619 311 36
Wyoming 1,728 1,651 25 -27
Pacific: 112,227 107,091 -74 -3,499
Alaska 1,524 1,437 50 -7
California 88,037 84,058 1,359 -1,294
Hawaii 2,103 2,068 -190 -213
Oregon 11,638 11,082 -626 -996
Washington 8,926 8,446 -667 -988
Total 779,221 740,044 -22,657 -48,775
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2014-2019. 
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on Medicaid, while uncompensated 
care savings would partially offset 
this expenditure by $0.6 billion to 
$1.3 billion. Therefore, net spending 
effects in Michigan are positive in both 
scenarios. Michigan currently enrolls 
a relatively small number of adults 
in Medicaid through income-based 
eligibility—similar to Texas—but has 
a much lower uninsured rate among 
adults than Texas. Thus, uncompensated 
care savings are significantly smaller in 
Michigan. 
Note that there are sources of state 
savings for which we have national 
estimates but not state-specific 
estimates. Accordingly, the state-specific 
numbers shown in Tables 8 and 9 do not 
equal the national totals shown in Table 
2 and likely underestimate each state’s 
potential fiscal gains under the ACA.  
To take the example of mental  
health services:
•	During fiscal year 2009, Texas spent 
$1.1 billion in General Fund revenues 
on such care.
24
 And for Michigan, 
$410 million in combined General 
Fund and local dollars were spent by 
the state’s mental health agency in 
2008.
25
 If 40 percent of these amounts 
were shifted to federal Medicaid 
dollars during the average year from 
2014 through 2019, the resulting 
savings would exceed each state’s 
“worst case” scenario of $2.4 billion 
and $900 million, respectively, in 
increased net spending. 
•	Even with proposed budget cuts, 
California’s Department of Mental 
Health was projected to spend $1.47 
billion in General Fund dollars in FY 
2010-2011.
26
 Shifting just one-sixth of 
this cost to the federal government 
during each year from 2014 through 
2019 would fully offset the state’s six-
year net spending rise of $1.4 billion 
under the worst-case scenario shown 
in Tables 8 and 9. 
2020 and Beyond
Our estimates so far have focused on 
2014-2019, the first six years of the 
Medicaid expansion and health benefit 
exchanges under the ACA. During this 
period, federal Medicaid match rates 
for the newly eligible decline from 
100 percent to 93 percent. Match rates 
for certain adults in “prior expansion” 
states rise up to 93 percent. Beginning 
in 2020, all of these match rates are 
set at 90 percent and do not change 
in subsequent years. Thus, total state 
spending on Medicaid from 2014 to 2019 
will be lower than from 2020 onwards. 
Table 10 presents results for 2020 in the 
same format as Table 2. States would still 
spend less under the ACA than without 
it, notwithstanding the slight reduction 
in the proportion of Medicaid costs paid 
by the federal government. The pattern 
Table 9: Effect of ACA on Various Types of State Spending, 2014 - 2019 
Does not include savings on mental health costs and certain medicaid eligibility cutbacks over 138% FPL included in national results.
Billions $ New York California Texas Michigan
Medicaid expansion
1
9.8 6.2 5.3 1.6
Enhanced Matching and Limited Benefits 
Programs
-20.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Relaxing Medicaid MOE for adults -0.1 -2.2 0.0 0.0
Uncompensated care savings -2.8 -1.4 -5.3 -2.7 -5.8 -2.9 -1.3 -0.6
Total difference in spending -13.5 -12.1 -1.3 1.4 -0.6 2.4 0.3 0.9
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2014-2019.
Note: Does not include the high MOE savings scenario or savings on mental health spending.
1Spending on acute care for the nonelderly
Table 10: Net Effects of ACA on Total State and Federal Spending, 2020
Billions $ Difference in Federal Spending Difference in State Spending
Low High Low High
Medicaid expansion
1
105 105 23 23
Increased federal Medicaid match for currently eligible adults 14 14 -14 -14
Eliminating Medicaid eligibility for adults >138% FPL
2
-18 -18 -14 -14
Premium and cost-sharing subsidies in the exchanges 68 68 0 0
Uncompensated care savings -15 -8 -10 -5
Mental Health Savings
3
0 0 -4 -2
Total difference in spending 155 163 -19 -12
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2020.
1Spending on acute care for the nonelderly
2 Federal savings in Medicaid spending partially offset by additonal federal spending on subsidies included in the fourth row. Adults include (a) those eligible for coverage under 1115 waivers and Social Security Act Section  
1931 and (b) 50% of others above 138% FPL who report Medicaid enrollment.
3Federal mental health expenditures are included in the Medicaid expansion row.
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for subsequent years will be similar to 
2020, but with some differences driven 
by economic and demographic changes 
over time.
Methods
To estimate the effects of health reform 
and the individual mandate, we use the 
Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model (HIPSM).
27
 HIPSM 
simulates the decisions of businesses 
and individuals in response to policy 
changes, such as Medicaid expansions, 
new health insurance options, subsidies 
for the purchase of health insurance 
and insurance market reforms. The 
model provides estimates of changes 
in government and private spending, 
premiums, rates of employer offers of 
coverage and health insurance coverage 
resulting from specific reforms.
28
 
For each year from 2014 to 2020, we 
used HIPSM to simulate the costs and 
coverage of health care both with the 
ACA implemented and without the ACA. 
Population changes over this period 
are based on Census projections. The 
following assumptions were made about 
economic conditions and the growth of 
underlying health care costs. We assume 
a decrease in the unemployment rate 
such that full employment is reached 
by 2015 and that unemployment rates 
continue in the subsequent years. 
Health care cost growth is assumed 
to be 4 percent annually for public 
and 5 percent for private spending. 
Our estimates thus do not assume an 
aggressive “bending of the cost curve.” 
If that is achieved, our cost estimates 
would, of course, be lower.
To simulate state-level results, we 
made the following enhancements 
to the model not reflected in earlier 
documentation:
•	Two years of CPS data (survey years 
2010 and 2009) were pooled together 
to increase state sample size. Results 
for large states are based on a larger 
number of surveyed households 
than results for small states, and thus 
have greater accuracy. Note that the 
CPS oversamples small states, so 
the number of observations is not 
necessarily proportional to state size. 
•	Medical expenditures were adjusted 
to reflect state-level differences in 
health care pricing and utilization 
as measured in the National Health 
Expenditure Accounts.
29
 
•	Private health insurance premiums 
reflect both the state-level differences 
in expenditures from the previous 
item and state-specific differences in 
the risk pools of enrollees for a given 
type of insurance.
•	The ACA was inspired in its general 
form by the comprehensive health 
reforms enacted in Massachusetts. 
The HIPSM results for Massachusetts 
without the ACA take into account 
some important provisions of that 
state’s health reform law such as the 
individual mandate and exchange 
(the Connector), though we did not 
comprehensively model it.
We calibrate the behavior of our 
model so that a standard expansion 
of Medicaid and CHIP achieves take-
up rates consistent with the empirical 
literature.
30
 These baseline take-up 
rates for the uninsured are between 
60 and 70 percent, depending on 
person type and income group. The 
ACA contains important provisions 
that would increase take-up. States 
are required to establish a Web site 
capable of determining eligibility for 
Medicaid and automatically enrolling 
eligibles. Hospitals would be able 
to make presumptive eligibility 
determinations. There would be other 
new requirements for simplifying 
enrollment and renewal of Medicaid 
and CHIP. Take-up rates vary based 
on individual characteristics, but the 
model achieves an average take-up rate 
of about 73 percent for the uninsured 
who are newly eligible. This rate is 
higher than the baseline rate due to 
outreach and enrollment simplification 
provisions in the ACA,
31
 as well as a 
modest indirect effect of the individual 
mandate as observed in health reform in 
Massachusetts; low-income consumers 
unaffected by that state’s mandate 
nevertheless were prompted to enroll 
when they paid careful attention to 
communications from state agencies 
regarding health coverage, unaware of 
the limits of the individual requirement 
to obtain coverage.
32
 Our Medicaid 
take-up analysis is consistent with the 
enhanced outreach scenario in Holahan 
and Headen.
33
 Had we instead used the 
lower take-up rates that are implied 
by the Congressional Budget Office’s 
estimates of ACA’s cost,
34
 our projected 
state cost increases for Medicaid 
enrollment would have been reduced, 
and net state fiscal effects would have 
appeared more favorable. 
To model federal and state Medicaid 
expenditure, we simulate several federal 
match rate scenarios as specified in the 
ACA. For the first three years of reform, 
2014-2016, the federal government will 
pay 100 percent of the costs of new 
Medicaid eligibles (Table 11). Beginning 
in 2017, the federal match rate decreases 
to 95 percent in 2017, 94 percent in 
2018, and 93 percent in 2019. The 90 
percent federal match rate for new 
eligibles in 2020 is carried forward into 
subsequent years. 
For the majority of current eligibles, 
the federal government will pay a 
percentage of costs according to state-
specific FMAP. The FMAP formula was 
developed in 1965 to give more support 
to states with lower per capita incomes 
and falls between 50 percent and 76 
percent, with the upper bound varying 
slightly by year. However, there are 
several pathways through which current 
eligibles will receive higher match rates, 
shown in Table 11.
Firstly, states that have expanded their 
Medicaid programs to include all adults 
with incomes up to 100 percent FPL will 
receive a higher match rate for some 
of this population under reform. Seven 
states currently use Medicaid to cover 
adults through at least 100 percent of 
the FPL: Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, Maine, New York and 
Vermont. These states will see a phased-
in increase of the federal match rate 
for their childless adult population 
according to the following formula: 
Federal Match Rate = State FMAP + 
((New Eligible Match Rate – State FMAP) 
* Transition Percentage)
The transition percentage increases 
from 50 percent to 100 percent between 
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2014 and 2020 since the childless 
adults in these seven states receive the 
New Eligible Match Rate by 2019. In 
the intermediate years, the Transition 
Percentage increases from 50 percent 
such that states with lower FMAPs 
receive more support. 
Secondly, states that have enacted limited 
Medicaid benefits programs for adults 
will receive the New Eligible Match 
Rate for these adults, provided their 
incomes are under 138 percent of the 
FPL. There are 10 states that have either 
extended limited Medicaid benefits to 
adults eligible through section 1115, or 
have taken advantage of the ACA’s option 
to cover childless adults before 2014: 
Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, 
Washington and Wisconsin.
35
 The ACA 
considers childless adults in these states 
as new eligibles in 2014 and thereafter.
36
 
Conclusion
More than half of the substantial 
increase in insurance coverage under 
the ACA would come from increased 
enrollment in Medicaid.
37
 The large 
majority of new Medicaid enrollees 
would have been ineligible in the past, 
so the federal government will pay 
a substantially higher share of their 
costs than for those eligible under 
pre-ACA rules. This federal share of 
costs for newly eligible adults declines 
from 100 percent in 2014-2016, to 
90 percent in 2020 and subsequent 
years, so additional enrollment in later 
years would mean additional state 
spending. However, the ACA also 
contains many provisions that substitute 
federal spending for state spending 
on such things as uncompensated 
care and mental health services, 
leading to savings for states that would 
significantly exceed additional state 
spending on new Medicaid enrollees. 
There will be significant variation in 
state spending and savings. The most 
important factors include:
•	The number of people, particularly 
low-income adults, currently without 
insurance;
•	The overall income distribution in  
a state;
•	The current presence or absence  
of income-based Medicaid eligibility 
thresholds for adults, particularly 
nonparents, close to or exceeding  
138 percent of the FPL; and
•	 State implementation decisions,  
such as Medicaid maintenance-of-
effort, the Basic Health Program 
option, and decisions about  
provider payment levels. The  
present national analysis assumes  
a uniform implementation.
Even under the limited savings 
categories for which we provide state-
level estimates, only five states would 
have ranges of net spending entirely 
above zero. Our estimates understate 
the savings that states would achieve. 
An accurate picture of net state 
spending under the ACA and if the law 
were repealed must take into account 
all of the types of savings we described 
earlier, including those requiring state-
specific analysis too detailed for this 
paper covering all states and D.C. 
Table 11: Federal Match Rates for New Medicaid Eligibles and Current 
Eligibles with Enhanced Matching
New Eligibles and 
Currently Eligible 
Adults in Limited 
Benefits States
Current Eligibles in Expansion States
 Transition 
Percentage
Enhanced Match 
Rates
2014 100% 50% 75% to 83%
2015 100% 60% 80% to 86%
2016 100% 70% 85% to 90%
2017 95% 80% 86% to 89%
2018 94% 90% 90% to 91%
2019 93% 100% 93%
2020 on 90% 100% 90%
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